Formal Opposition to

Summary of Position

I submit this formal opposition to the Financial Service Providers (Registration and Dispute Resolution) Amendment Bill (Government Bill 136–1), introduced by Hon Scott Simpson. While the bill claims to enhance oversight and governance, it centralises Ministerial control, undermines board independence, legalises non-compliance, and weakens the integrity of dispute resolution for consumers.

This bill sets a dangerous precedent — where oversight becomes ministerial influence, and compliance becomes optional.

1. Centralises Control Over Independent Reviews

Section 67B allows the Minister to:

• Appoint the reviewer,
• Set review scope and timing,
• Decide costs and payment terms,
• Mandate public responses from schemes within 3 months.

This transforms "independent review" into a Minister-directed process — eroding impartiality and trust.

2. Allows Regulatory Stacking of Governance Boards

Section 79(1)(caa) permits future regulations to define:

• Skills, exclusions, and independence criteria,
• Group-wide roles, including chairs and deputies.

None of these standards are in the bill itself — enabling political reconfiguration of governance boards through regulation.

3. Legalises Invalid Appointments

Section 79AAA states that failure to follow regulations when appointing a board member does not invalidate:

• Their appointment,
• The board’s decisions,
• The acts of that member.

This effectively removes consequences for non-compliance and shields flawed governance structures from legal challenge.

4. Strips Schemes of Internal Autonomy

Schedule 1AA(5) exempts some rule changes (e.g. removing internal review procedures) from public notice and Ministerial approval requirements under Sections 65 and 66.

This undermines scheme self-governance and removes transparency from critical procedural changes.

5. Imposes Financial Burdens Without Accountability

Section 67D forces schemes to pay for the entire cost of reviews — with no safeguards, caps, or dispute channels. Costs are enforceable as debts, allowing the Minister to exert financial pressure.

6. Fails to Advance Consumer Protection

This bill claims to improve dispute resolution, but:

• Provides no new rights or remedies for consumers,
• Offers no evidence of systemic failure requiring this intervention,
• Introduces no mandatory consultation with consumer advocacy groups.

It enables state control, not better protection for the public.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This bill should not proceed in its current form. It redefines independent dispute resolution as a ministerially controlled system — undermining its credibility, autonomy, and consumer focus.

• Delete Section 79AAA entirely,
• Limit the Minister’s power to dictate reviews under Section 67B,
• Ensure governance standards are fixed in legislation, not deferred to regulation,
• Restore transparency and accountability to internal scheme rules,
• Introduce appeal rights and cost caps for imposed review fees.

Dispute resolution must be structurally independent, not politically adjustable. This bill fails to uphold that standard.

Respectfully submitted,

Ukes Baha

Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst

ukesbaha.com