Formal Opposition to
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (Supervisor, Levy, and Other Matters) Amendment Bill

(Government Bill 181–1, Nicole McKee)

From: Ukes Baha | 15 August 2025

Submitted in response to the call for public submissions on the Bill.

1. Summary of Position

I oppose the Bill in its entirety. Marketed as “efficiency” and “reduced compliance costs,” it centralises power, weakens safeguards, increases regulatory cost exposure, and subordinates domestic policy to international optics.

2. Core Concerns

2.1 Centralising a single, executive-controlled supervisor

The Bill replaces the DIA/RBNZ/FMA model with a single AML/CFT supervisor defined as the public service agency responsible “with the authority of the Prime Minister,” and transfers functions to DIA. This collapses checks and balances, heightens political-influence risk, and discards sector expertise. (Clause 5; new definition of supervisor. Schedule 1, Part 3.)

2.2 Delegated law-making (rules & notices) expanded

Substantial obligations can be created or altered by officials via rules and notices rather than by Parliament. Consultation can be skipped for “minor/technical” changes, and urgent levy amendments can bypass consultation entirely. (Clauses 31–32; new ss156B–156J; s156(2).)

2.3 Entry into homes

New s133A permits entry to dwellinghouses used for business—by consent or warrant—for on-site inspections. Extending compliance powers into private homes is disproportionate, particularly for home-based or part-time operators. (Clause 23; new s133A.)

2.4 Compulsory interviews & broad information demands

Section 132 is expanded so the supervisor can require any person suspected of having relevant knowledge to attend and answer questions (with limited protection against self-incrimination). This invites coercive fishing expeditions and chills lawful activity. (Clause 21; s132.)

2.5 Levy scheme: open-ended costs & selective relief

All reporting entities must pay a levy set by regulation; shortfalls can be back-recovered over multiple years; and the chief executive may exempt entities or classes—creating uncertainty, retrospective-style charging, and potential favouritism. (Clause 30; new ss155A–155E.)

2.6 Wide discretionary exemptions

Officials can exempt entire classes of entities, transactions, products, or services from core obligations—reshaping the regime by notice. (New ss156E–156G.)

2.7 External direction via FATF

The Minister must review the national AML/CFT strategy after each FATF mutual evaluation—baking foreign assessment cycles into domestic settings and eroding parliamentary sovereignty. (New s149C.)

2.8 Consultation weakened in practice

Multiple provisions allow consultation to be skipped for “minor/technical” changes; urgent levy amendments may proceed without consultation; and failures to consult do not affect validity—undermining accountability for substantive change. (s156B(3); s156C(4); s156(2); s156I(3).)

3. Recommendations

  1. Reject the Bill in its current form.
  2. Retain the multi-agency model to preserve independent oversight and sector expertise.
  3. Tightly confine or remove exemption powers (ss156E–G) to prevent selective or politicised carve-outs.
  4. Subject all levy settings to full parliamentary process and prohibit multi-year shortfall recovery (ss155A–155E).
  5. Prohibit entry to dwellinghouses for supervision; limit any entry to criminal investigations by Police under the Search and Surveillance Act with high thresholds (s133A; s118 link to SSA 2012).
  6. Restore robust consultation—remove “minor/technical/urgent” shortcuts; make consultation failures fatal to validity (s156; ss156B–156J).
  7. Ensure FATF alignment does not override domestic priorities—make the national strategy review optional and evidence-led, not FATF-triggered (s149C).
  8. Require an explicit NZBORA assessment (s21 search/seizure; fair trial and self-incrimination) for powers affecting homes and compelled meetings.

4. Conclusion

The Bill shifts New Zealand’s AML/CFT regime from a multi-agency, transparent system to a centralised, executive-driven model with expansive delegated law-making and fewer checks. It invites regulatory capture and political influence, increases cost risk, and authorises unjustified incursions into private life—under the banner of “efficiency.” It should be rejected or amended to remove these high-risk features.

Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com