(Government Bill 187–1, Paul Goldsmith)
From: Ukes Baha | 12 September 2025
Submitted in response to the call for submissions on the Constitution Amendment Bill
I oppose the Constitution Amendment Bill in its current form.
Marketed as a “tidy up” to ensure continuity of government, this Bill would in practice erode a core democratic safeguard: that Ministers must be Members of Parliament and directly accountable to the House. By extending ministerial and under-secretarial office beyond electoral legitimacy, the Bill risks normalising unelected executive power, weakens caretaker conventions, and creates loopholes open to manipulation or abuse.
Core stance: Continuity of government matters, but it must be achieved through stronger electoral administration and clear, binding caretaker rules—not by extending executive power beyond parliamentary mandate.
Recommendation: Withdraw the Bill. If Parliament proceeds regardless, resolve transition issues by legislating caretaker conventions, not by weakening the principle that executive authority is grounded in being an MP.
Problem: The Bill permits Ministers who have ceased to be MPs to remain in office until the Electoral Commission declares list candidates.
Risks: Creates an extended period in which individuals without seats in the House exercise executive authority; weakens ministerial responsibility to Parliament; in scenarios of hung Parliaments or protracted negotiations, this could last months, not days.
Position: Reject. Continuity should be provided by MPs who still hold seats, not by those who have lost their mandate.
Problem: The Bill relies on caretaker norms rather than enforceable limits.
Risks: Conventions are fragile and can be ignored; without statutory constraints, unelected Ministers could approve decisions, appointments, or contracts during a legitimacy gap; public trust depends on binding rules, not goodwill.
Position: If continuity is the aim, legislate clear caretaker restrictions (scope, appointments, expenditure, contracts) instead of extending unelected tenure.
Problem: Clause 5 extends office for Under-Secretaries similarly.
Risks: Wording risks allowing an Under-Secretary who ceases to be an MP for reasons other than an election (resignation, disqualification, expulsion) to remain in office until the next Parliament—an unintended and serious constitutional loophole.
Position: Reject outright. Under-Secretaries must vacate office immediately upon ceasing to be MPs.
Problem: Government arguments to tighten enrolment timelines for “efficiency” sit uneasily with removing the 28-day limit for Ministers.
Risks: Selective reform protects politicians’ continuity while curtailing voter rights; the philosophy is inconsistent and undermines confidence in neutrality.
Position: Do not weaken voter access while expanding politicians’ privileges.
Problem: Ministerial tenure is tied to the Electoral Commission’s declaration of list candidates.
Risks: Incentivises stalling or challenging counts, recounts, or list declarations; reduces urgency to expedite results; benefits incumbents during drawn-out processes.
Position: Continuity must not be incentivised by delay. Retain fixed limits or impose hard safeguards.
Problem: Treating the Bill as a minor “tidy up” and fast-tracking scrutiny risks trivialising constitutional change.
Risks: Signals self-serving entrenchment of power; fuels cynicism that politicians extend authority after losing office; damages confidence in Parliament.
Position: Withdraw. At minimum, extend consultation and pair any continuity mechanism with statutory caretaker limits and voter-access protections.
Problem: The Bill is piecemeal, addressing only ministerial continuity.
Risks: Ignores broader reform needs raised in debate (e.g., legislating caretaker rules; enrolment rights; Te Tiriti-grounded participation; clarity for transitions under MMP); prioritises incumbent protection over systemic integrity.
Position: Undertake comprehensive reform rather than patchwork measures that entrench incumbency.
This Bill is not a neutral adjustment. It erodes democratic accountability by extending the power of unelected Ministers and Under-Secretaries, relies on weak conventions, invites manipulation, and undermines public trust.
Recommendations:
Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com