Formal Opposition to
Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill
(Government Bill 200–1, Judith Collins)
From: Ukes Baha | 03 October 2025
Submitted in response to the call for the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill
Summary of Position
I ask the Committee to reject the Bill.
I oppose the Bill in its current form. Although presented as an administrative clarification to improve Defence workforce management, this Bill in fact represents a substantive constitutional and labour-rights shift. It extends ministerial power, weakens parliamentary oversight, and erodes the industrial rights of civilian Defence employees by allowing the armed forces to replace them during lawful strike action.
Core stance
- Executive overreach: Transfers oversight of armed-forces deployment from Parliament to a single Minister, reducing democratic accountability. bills.parliament.nz+2NZ Legislation+2
- Strike-breaking by statute: Section 9A(4)(a) expressly removes Employment Relations Act protections, enabling the State to override lawful industrial action. Employment Relations Act 2000 s97+1
- Vague “national security/readiness” triggers: Expansive, undefined wording invites political and operational misuse. NZDF.mil.nz Impact Statement+1
- Unlimited extensions: Section 9A(8) allows indefinite renewals of authorisations, effectively normalising military substitution for civilian labour. bills.parliament.nz+1
- Transparency reduced: Notification to Parliament may omit “sensitive information,” converting accountability into executive discretion. Clause 9A(7)+1
Recommendation: Reject the Bill. If Parliament proceeds, insert independent oversight, time-bound authorisations, mandatory reporting, and explicit guarantees that military substitution cannot be used to undermine lawful industrial action.
Constitutional & Democratic Framework
- Parliamentary oversight removed: Existing section 9(8) required a House resolution to extend authorisations. The new s9(9) replaces this with automatic extension, sidelining Parliament during adjournment. New Zealand Legislation (Defence Act 1990)+1
- Ministerial monopoly of decision-making: New section 9A empowers the Minister to act “on reasonable grounds” without Cabinet or independent confirmation. This violates the constitutional principle that the military operates under collective civilian control, not personal ministerial decree. NZDF Act Context+1
- Secrecy by design: Section 9A(7) permits withholding of “sensitive information” from Parliament. This provision, while framed as security protection, removes the very evidence required for democratic scrutiny.
- Civil-military imbalance: By allowing the Armed Forces to substitute for striking civilians, the Bill blurs the essential constitutional boundary between military obedience and civilian labour relations.
Clause-by-Clause Concerns (targeted examples)
1) Section 9(9) — Automatic extension during adjournment
Problem: Extends authorisation without parliamentary vote whenever the House is not sitting, eliminating the check that previously required democratic renewal.
Position: Reinstate requirement for House resolution within 7 days of re-sitting; no automatic extensions. bills.parliament.nz (200–1 Explanatory Note)+1
2) New section 9A(1)–(2) — Minister’s sole authority
Problem: Power rests solely on the Minister’s belief “on reasonable grounds” — a subjective test with no independent verification. It permits executive substitution of civil staff under broad headings of “national security,” “readiness,” or “health and safety.” NZDF Impact Statement+1
Position: Require Cabinet approval or independent Defence Council concurrence for any invocation; define “national security,” “readiness,” and “core defence outputs” narrowly.
3) Section 9A(4)(a) — Exclusion from Employment Relations Act s97
Problem: Explicitly disapplies the ban on strike-breaking by replacing civil staff with armed forces. This undermines collective bargaining rights and contravenes ILO Convention 87. PSA.org.nz+1 ILO.org+1
Position: Delete 9A(4)(a) or limit it strictly to operational roles where public safety is immediately endangered.
4) Section 9A(5)–(7) — Notification without consultation
Problem: Requires the Chief of Defence to inform affected civil staff and unions after authorisation — not before. This converts consultation into after-the-fact notice, disempowering unions and escalating industrial tension. PSA Statement Aug 2025+1
Position: Require consultation “where practicable” before authorisation and include union representatives in risk assessment.
5) Section 9A(8)–(9) — Unlimited extensions
Problem: No statutory limit on duration or number of renewals; authorisation can be rolled over indefinitely by ministerial notice. bills.parliament.nz+1
Position: Cap total period to 30 days extendable once only; require Select Committee review for any further extension.
Rights, Labour & Equity Considerations
Beyond constitutional issues, the Bill raises serious concerns regarding workers’ rights and equity obligations.
- Right to strike and freedom of association: The Bill conflicts with section 17 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and ILO Conventions 87 and 98 protecting collective bargaining. Employment Court precedent recognises that strike replacement undermines good-faith bargaining. Employment Relations Act 2000+2
- Industrial relations climate: By empowering the Defence Force to cross picket lines, the Bill risks fracturing morale within the Force and breeding mistrust between military and civilian components. HCA Mag Aug 2025+1
- Te Tiriti and equity implications: The NZDF civil workforce includes significant Māori representation; erosion of collective rights disproportionately affects these employees. No public Te Tiriti impact assessment has been published. Defence.govt.nz RIS+1
Evidence & Accountability
- Withheld risk analysis: The Regulatory Impact Statement withheld sections on operational and rights impacts for “security reasons,” limiting public scrutiny. Defence.govt.nz RIS+1
- Historical context: The 2024 industrial action by NZDF civil staff was managed within existing 14-day rules without compromising national security — demonstrating that the present Bill addresses inconvenience, not necessity. PSA Press Release Aug 2025+1
- Comparative standards: Allied jurisdictions (UK, Canada, Australia) require parliamentary or ministerial-Cabinet joint approval for military deployment in domestic industrial matters; New Zealand should not lower this standard. Defence Select Committee UK 2024+1
Recommendations
Reject the Bill.
To preserve democratic and industrial integrity, I recommend the following amendments if the Bill proceeds:
- Reinstate the House resolution requirement for any extension of armed forces deployment under section 9(8). New Zealand Legislation+1
- Require Cabinet approval and written Defence Council certification before the Minister may authorise military substitution under section 9A. NZDF Act Context+1
- Delete section 9A(4)(a) or confine it to immediate life-safety situations only. Employment Relations Act 2000 s97+1
- Impose a maximum duration of 30 days (extendable once only) for any authorisation under section 9A(8). bills.parliament.nz+1
- Mandate Select Committee reporting of each invocation (with classified annex if needed) within 7 sitting days. Parliament.nz Standing Orders+1
- Insert a statutory requirement for consultation with affected unions and Te Tiriti partners before authorisation. PSA Submission 2025+1
- Create an independent oversight role (Inspector-General of Defence or Ombudsman) to audit use of these powers and report annually to Parliament. Ombudsman.govt.nz+1
- Add a sunset clause requiring review and affirmative renewal of these provisions within five years of enactment. New Zealand Legislation+1
References
- Bill page (Parliament): Bill 200–1; Minister of Defence Judith Collins; committee: Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade. bills.parliament.nz+2
- Bill text: New section 9A (Use of Armed Forces to perform work of Civil Staff) and amended section 9(9). legislation.govt.nz+2
- Defence Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS): Defence.govt.nz (Aug 2025). Defence.govt.nz+1
- PSA press release “Restriction on Right for Defence Staff to Strike Unjustified” (Scoop, 14 Aug 2025). PSA.org.nz+2 Scoop.co.nz+1
- HCA Mag report “Push for Uniformed Personnel to Take Striking NZDF Civilian Staff’s Posts” (Aug 2025). HCA Mag+1
- ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on Freedom of Association and Right to Organise. ILO.org+1
- UK Defence Committee (2024): “Civil-Military Boundaries in Domestic Operations.” UK Parliament Publications+1
Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com