Formal Opposition to
Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill

(Government Bill 200–1, Judith Collins)

From: Ukes Baha | 03 October 2025

Submitted in response to the call for the Defence (Workforce) Amendment Bill


Summary of Position

I ask the Committee to reject the Bill.

I oppose the Bill in its current form. Although presented as an administrative clarification to improve Defence workforce management, this Bill in fact represents a substantive constitutional and labour-rights shift. It extends ministerial power, weakens parliamentary oversight, and erodes the industrial rights of civilian Defence employees by allowing the armed forces to replace them during lawful strike action.

Core stance

Recommendation: Reject the Bill. If Parliament proceeds, insert independent oversight, time-bound authorisations, mandatory reporting, and explicit guarantees that military substitution cannot be used to undermine lawful industrial action.


Constitutional & Democratic Framework


Clause-by-Clause Concerns (targeted examples)

1) Section 9(9) — Automatic extension during adjournment

Problem: Extends authorisation without parliamentary vote whenever the House is not sitting, eliminating the check that previously required democratic renewal.

Position: Reinstate requirement for House resolution within 7 days of re-sitting; no automatic extensions. bills.parliament.nz (200–1 Explanatory Note)+1

2) New section 9A(1)–(2) — Minister’s sole authority

Problem: Power rests solely on the Minister’s belief “on reasonable grounds” — a subjective test with no independent verification. It permits executive substitution of civil staff under broad headings of “national security,” “readiness,” or “health and safety.” NZDF Impact Statement+1

Position: Require Cabinet approval or independent Defence Council concurrence for any invocation; define “national security,” “readiness,” and “core defence outputs” narrowly.

3) Section 9A(4)(a) — Exclusion from Employment Relations Act s97

Problem: Explicitly disapplies the ban on strike-breaking by replacing civil staff with armed forces. This undermines collective bargaining rights and contravenes ILO Convention 87. PSA.org.nz+1 ILO.org+1

Position: Delete 9A(4)(a) or limit it strictly to operational roles where public safety is immediately endangered.

4) Section 9A(5)–(7) — Notification without consultation

Problem: Requires the Chief of Defence to inform affected civil staff and unions after authorisation — not before. This converts consultation into after-the-fact notice, disempowering unions and escalating industrial tension. PSA Statement Aug 2025+1

Position: Require consultation “where practicable” before authorisation and include union representatives in risk assessment.

5) Section 9A(8)–(9) — Unlimited extensions

Problem: No statutory limit on duration or number of renewals; authorisation can be rolled over indefinitely by ministerial notice. bills.parliament.nz+1

Position: Cap total period to 30 days extendable once only; require Select Committee review for any further extension.


Rights, Labour & Equity Considerations

Beyond constitutional issues, the Bill raises serious concerns regarding workers’ rights and equity obligations.


Evidence & Accountability


Recommendations

Reject the Bill.

To preserve democratic and industrial integrity, I recommend the following amendments if the Bill proceeds:

  1. Reinstate the House resolution requirement for any extension of armed forces deployment under section 9(8). New Zealand Legislation+1
  2. Require Cabinet approval and written Defence Council certification before the Minister may authorise military substitution under section 9A. NZDF Act Context+1
  3. Delete section 9A(4)(a) or confine it to immediate life-safety situations only. Employment Relations Act 2000 s97+1
  4. Impose a maximum duration of 30 days (extendable once only) for any authorisation under section 9A(8). bills.parliament.nz+1
  5. Mandate Select Committee reporting of each invocation (with classified annex if needed) within 7 sitting days. Parliament.nz Standing Orders+1
  6. Insert a statutory requirement for consultation with affected unions and Te Tiriti partners before authorisation. PSA Submission 2025+1
  7. Create an independent oversight role (Inspector-General of Defence or Ombudsman) to audit use of these powers and report annually to Parliament. Ombudsman.govt.nz+1
  8. Add a sunset clause requiring review and affirmative renewal of these provisions within five years of enactment. New Zealand Legislation+1

References


Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com