Formal Opposition to
Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill
(Government Bill 191–1, David Seymour)
From: Ukes Baha | 26 August 2025
Submitted in response to the call for Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill
Summary of Position
We oppose the Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill in its current form.
While presented as a measure to “improve effectiveness” and “reduce regulatory burden,” the bill instead centralises power in a new statutory role (Director of Regulation), reframes early childhood education (ECE) as primarily a labour-market support function, expands intrusive information-gathering powers, and risks privileging large commercial operators over community-based providers.
It weakens checks and balances by concentrating oversight in a single office, allows delegation of core regulatory powers to private actors, and risks undermining culturally grounded, community-led, and kaupapa Māori early childhood education models. Far from improving children’s outcomes, this bill shifts focus toward compliance, cost-containment, and market efficiency at the expense of child wellbeing, equity, and accountability.
1. Reframing of Purpose Away from Child-Centred Focus
Reference: s14 (Purpose of Part 2).
Problem:
- The new purpose statement makes regulation not only about child development and wellbeing but also about “support[ing] the choice of parents and caregivers to participate in the labour market.”
- This shifts ECE from a rights-based, child-centred service toward an economic tool for workforce participation.
Risk: Children’s needs become secondary to productivity goals, undermining the foundational principle that education should first serve the child.
2. Centralisation of Power in a Director of Regulation
Reference: ss 27A–27E.
Problem:
- The Director holds broad powers: licensing, monitoring, compliance enforcement, investigations, prosecutions, complaints, and regulatory strategy.
- While described as “independent,” the Director is appointed by and accountable to the Ministry Secretary, creating blurred lines of independence.
Risk: Over-concentration of authority in one office risks politicisation, inconsistency, and regulatory capture, reducing sector trust.
3. Conflicts in Independence and Accountability
Reference: s27C.
Problem:
- The Director must act independently of the Minister when exercising statutory functions but is simultaneously accountable to the Secretary.
- This dual accountability structure undermines genuine independence.
Risk: Decisions may still be shaped by Ministerial or bureaucratic pressures, compromising fairness and neutrality.
4. Delegation of Regulatory Powers
Reference: s27E.
Problem:
- The Director may delegate licensing, enforcement, and investigative powers, including to non-Ministry staff, with only Secretary consent.
- Sensitive regulatory functions could be outsourced to private consultants or contractors.
Risk: Reduced accountability, increased conflicts of interest, and potential commercial influence over regulation.
5. Expansion of Information-Gathering Powers
Reference: s619A.
Problem:
- The Director may compel service providers to provide information, including identifiable data, with limited safeguards.
- The only restriction is that identifiable information be used for “statistical purposes.”
Risk: Weak privacy protections for children, families, and providers. Risks of data misuse, overreach, and loss of trust.
6. Market-Oriented Objectives Over Community Needs
Reference: s14A(c)–(d).
Problem:
- Objectives emphasise “choice” and market clarity rather than community participation or cultural integrity.
- Risks favouring large commercial providers who can adapt to compliance systems more easily than small, community, Māori, or Pasifika-led services.
Risk: Erosion of diversity, loss of kaupapa Māori control, and reduced accessibility for rural or community-based playgroups.
7. Cost-Containment as a Legal Principle
Reference: s27D(d)(ii).
Problem:
- Embeds “avoid[ing] unnecessary costs” as a guiding regulatory principle.
- Prioritises efficiency and budget savings over best practice and safety.
Risk: Normalises regulatory light-touch approaches that compromise quality standards for children.
8. Retrospective Transfer of Functions and Decisions
Reference: Schedule 1, cls 127–129.
Problem:
- All existing Secretary decisions automatically become Director decisions, even if under review.
- Appeals and judicial reviews simply transfer to the Director, potentially complicating legal clarity.
Risk: Weakens accountability for past flawed decisions and blurs responsibility in ongoing disputes.
9. Entrenchment of Top-Down Policy Control
Reference: ss 636(4A), 637(3A).
Problem:
- The Secretary is entrenched as the Minister’s “principal policy adviser” on licensing criteria.
- Combined with the Director’s centralised role, this diminishes genuine sector consultation.
Risk: Policy settings risk being shaped by ideology or lobbying from large providers rather than community or educational needs.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This bill does not strengthen early childhood education—it centralises control, embeds market priorities, expands intrusive data powers, and risks eroding diversity and community-led provision. It reframes ECE as a labour-market tool rather than a child-centred right.
Recommendations:
- Withdraw the bill in full.
- Retain child-centred purpose language—remove labour-market productivity from the statutory purpose.
- Distribute regulatory responsibilities—avoid over-concentration in a single Director.
- Strengthen independence safeguards—make the Director accountable to Parliament, not the Ministry.
- Prohibit delegation of licensing and enforcement powers to non-Ministry actors.
- Strengthen privacy protections and restrict identifiable data use with independent oversight.
- Protect community-led, kaupapa Māori, Pasifika, and rural playgroups from regulatory overreach.
- Remove cost-containment as a guiding principle; prioritise quality and safety.
- Ensure consultation and plural policy input rather than centralising advisory functions in the Secretary and Ministry.
Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com