(Government Bill 186–1, Paul Goldsmith)
From: Ukes Baha | 07 September 2025
Submitted in response to the call for submissions on the Electoral Amendment Bill
I oppose the Electoral Amendment Bill in its current form.
Marketed as a package to “improve timeliness and efficiency” and “strengthen integrity,” this Bill would in practice erode fundamental rights, narrow democratic participation, centralise executive discretion, and politicise operational decisions. Several provisions are inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), undermine ICCPR Article 25 (the right to vote and be elected), and conflict with Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations to ensure Māori participation and protection.
Core stance: The franchise is universal. The right to vote is not conditional on the length or fact of imprisonment. Attempts to ration or retract it by statute are rights-breaching. Likewise, automatic relocation of electors without consent, sweeping executive validation powers, and political involvement in polling operations are anti-democratic and must be rejected.
Recommendation: Withdraw the Bill. If Parliament proceeds regardless, the rights-breaching and anti-democratic clauses identified below must be struck out in full.
References: new s80(1)(d); ss86A–86G
Problem: Disqualifies all sentenced prisoners from registering and voting.
Why unlawful: The franchise is universal. Citizenship is not extinguished by imprisonment. Any disenfranchisement—duration-based or blanket—breaches NZBORA and international standards. Sentence length is irrelevant to the right to vote.
Impacts: Disproportionately silences Māori and low-income communities; functions as political outcome engineering rather than “integrity”.
Position: Strike out in full. All prisoners retain the vote; the state must facilitate in-prison voting access.
Reference: new s89CA
Problem: Allows the Electoral Commission to change an elector’s address and even move them between electorates without elector-initiated notice, on third-party data, unless the person objects within 28 days.
Risks: Violates natural justice and autonomy; creates wrongful transfers; endangers survivors and protected electors; disenfranchises those who never receive notices.
Position: Strike out. Enrolment details must not be altered without the elector’s clear, informed confirmation.
Reference: new s266
Problem: Permits the Governor-General, by Order in Council, to extend times, validate acts done early/late, or “make such other provision … as the Governor-General thinks fit.”
Risks: Sweeping Henry-VIII-style power that can retrospectively cure unlawful electoral acts, undermining judicial oversight and public confidence.
Position: Strike out in full. Electoral legality must not be regularised by executive decree.
References: new ss171C–171E
Problem: The Chief Electoral Officer must consult the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition before shortening/lengthening/curtailing advance polling.
Risks: Injects partisan actors into operational decisions, threatening the independence and perceived neutrality of election administration.
Position: Strike out. Operational decisions must be independent of political offices.
Reference: new s218A
Problem: Bans providing free food, drink, or entertainment within 100 metres of polling places (with narrow exceptions), even where no inducement occurs.
Risks: Chills harmless community traditions (e.g., school sausage sizzles), suppresses turnout-friendly civic culture, adds needless criminal liability. “Treating” and bribery offences already target improper inducement.
Position: Strike out.
References: s64 (party registration freeze); s71E (logo registration freeze)
Problem: Prohibits party/logo registrations during regulated periods, including snap cycles.
Risks: Locks out new entrants and rebrand corrections; advantages incumbents; reduces voter choice.
Position: Strike out.
References: s55; ss64–65 (78B/78C, 89DA changes)
Problem: Tighter blackout windows around by-elections and out-of-cycle local elections; constrained Māori option communications.
Risks: Depresses Māori roll mobility and participation; inconsistent with Te Tiriti obligations of participation and protection.
Position: Remove constraints that impair Māori political agency.
References: new s173B; reg 35(2)
Problem: Permits examination of special vote declarations before polls close; scrutineers may be present.
Risks: Perception (or reality) of early intelligence on rejection rates/turnout patterns; heightened leakage risk; inconsistent standards across centres; public trust damage.
Position: Remove pre-close examination powers. Special votes should be processed post-poll under uniform scrutiny.
References: ss13, 16, 19, 22 (expanded contact fields, list content); ss110–115 (six-year online publication of returns)
Problem: Wider personal contact capture/disclosure; long online exposure of donations/loans/expenses.
Risks: Doxxing/harassment vectors for candidates, donors, and volunteers; chilling participation—especially for small actors and vulnerable communities.
Position: Remove expansions that expose private data and reconsider online publication parameters to protect safety while maintaining necessary transparency.
References: definition of “close of registration” = 13 days; s88; s104 (annual main roll printing)
Problem: Compresses last-minute enrolments/updates; printed rolls risk staleness in high-mobility electorates.
Risks: Disproportionate impacts on youth, renters, migrants, people in crisis; more special votes and rejection risk.
Position: Oppose access-reducing timelines and practices that predictably disenfranchise mobile and marginalised voters.
References: s142 (notice); s145 (reject/accept); ss146B, 146G; s143(4)–(4A) (head office by noon)
Problem: Concentrates nomination lodgement at EC head office by a hard noon deadline.
Risks: Single-point-of-failure (system outage, courier delay, disaster); disadvantages candidates distant from head office; increases exclusion risk for minor parties/independents.
Position: Oppose centralisation that risks arbitrary exclusion from the ballot.
References: s4D (3–7 members incl. CEO/chair/deputy); s4I (deputies)
Problem: Expanded membership and deputy appointments without strengthened cross-party appointment safeguards or staggered terms.
Risks: Perception (or reality) of partisan reshaping of the Commission near election cycles.
Position: Oppose governance changes that weaken independence in fact or appearance.
References: s204B, s205C, s206C, s206V; new s266A (CPI auto-adjustment & EC website publication)
Problem: Critical spend caps and promoter thresholds recalibrated administratively with rounding rules and no Parliamentary process; audit/reporting asymmetries persist for lower-spend actors.
Risks: Uneven transparency, reduced Parliamentary accountability, and policy-like settings made without public scrutiny.
Position: Oppose shifting core campaign-finance levers to administrative notice; such fundamentals require full legislative control and scrutiny.
References: reg 23 (ordinary ballots in hospitals); reg 28A (pre-2pm parcels); s171A
Problem: More ordinary ballots outside standard polling-place routines; early parceling of rolls/ballots before polling day ends.
Risks: Chain-of-custody complexity; reconciliation challenges; inconsistent practice across districts; increased contestability.
Position: Oppose measures that heighten integrity risks for marginal convenience gains.
References: s204A, s204F, s221A (contact detail definitions & statements)
Problem: Broad “contact details” (including links/phone) mandated across media.
Risks: Low-resource civic actors and volunteers face harassment risks and compliance traps; chilling effect on civic speech.
Position: Oppose expansions that unnecessarily expose individuals beyond what is strictly necessary for accountability.
The combined effect of prisoner disenfranchisement, Māori option constraints, automatic roll movements, and access-reducing timelines is to systematically depress Māori participation. That is inconsistent with Te Tiriti principles of partnership, participation, and protection, and compounds historical inequities in representation.
The Bill’s asserted aims (timeliness, efficiency, integrity) are not met by measures that remove rights, centralise executive discretion, and politicise operations. The curative executive power (s266), blanket disenfranchisement (s80), and automatic roll changes (s89CA) are neither necessary nor proportionate to any demonstrated problem, and will predictably reduce trust and participation.
This Bill is not a neutral administrative tune-up. It narrows the electorate, weakens independence, and elevates executive discretion over electoral legality, in ways hostile to rights, Te Tiriti, and public trust.
Recommendations:
Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com