Formal Submission Opposing

Introduction

This submission is made in my personal capacity, as a concerned New Zealand citizen and legal thinker, and draws upon interpretive, human rights-based, and public interest standards consistent with senior legal advice often rendered by Crown Counsel. I respectfully submit my opposition to the Juries (Age of Excusal) Amendment Bill introduced by Carl Bates, which seeks to amend the Juries Act 1981 by increasing the age of automatic excusal from jury service from 65 years to 72 years.

While facially modest, the proposed amendment carries significant implications for human dignity, administrative fairness, and the integrity of the justice system.

Summary of Submission

I oppose this Bill in full and recommend that it not proceed beyond First Reading. My principal reasons are as follows:

• It removes the automatic right of excusal at 65, undermining the dignity and autonomy of older adults.
• It disregards the medical and social realities of those aged 65–71.
• It lacks evidentiary basis, public consultation, and fails the proportionality threshold under NZBORA.
• It imposes administrative burdens on both citizens and court registrars.

1. Statutory and Contextual Background

Sections 15 and 15A of the Juries Act 1981 currently provide that individuals aged 65 years or over may be automatically excused from jury service, should they wish to be.

This provision is not a ban; it simply grants those aged 65+ a default opt-out right — a legal accommodation that respects the practical realities of ageing while preserving voluntariness.

2. Reasons for Opposition

2.1 Disregard for Age-Related Vulnerabilities

The Bill proposes a significant shift in policy without acknowledging that between the ages of 65 and 72, a large proportion of New Zealanders develop or live with:

• Chronic illness (e.g., diabetes, cardiovascular disease, arthritis, gout)
• Cognitive decline (including early-stage Alzheimer’s, MCI, post-stroke fatigue)
• Mental health challenges (e.g., depression, anxiety, and social withdrawal)
• Sensory impairment (hearing and vision loss)

These realities are not always clinically severe, yet materially impair one’s ability to concentrate, engage, or endure extended trials. A registrar’s discretion cannot fully substitute the broad and silent protection that the current automatic excusal provides.

2.2 Erosion of Dignity and Autonomy

The right to decline jury service at 65 is a recognition of earned societal contribution and the shifting balance of responsibilities in older adulthood. Requiring people aged 65–71 to apply for exemption imposes psychological, logistical, and administrative burdens that many may feel ashamed or intimidated to navigate.

2.3 Lack of Proportionality and Evidence

There is no published data to support the need for this amendment:

• No clear jury shortages attributed to age-based excusals
• No assessment of trial fairness or system strain due to current age rules

In the absence of compelling evidence, this Bill fails to meet the "reasonable limits" test under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The proposed limitation on older adults’ right to decline state-imposed duties cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

2.4 Disproportionate Effect on the Vulnerable

The amendment would disproportionately affect older adults with lower socio-economic status, limited literacy, restricted access to healthcare, or those living in rural or isolated areas. These individuals are less likely to be aware of their right to apply for exemption, less able to navigate formal processes, and more likely to feel compelled to serve — even when physically, mentally, or emotionally unfit to do so.

This not only places undue burden on already vulnerable individuals, but introduces invisible structural bias into jury selection. The result may be a greater presence of reluctant, fatigued, or cognitively impaired jurors — which risks undermining trial fairness, distorting deliberations, and eroding confidence in the integrity of verdicts.

2.5 Philosophical and Precedential Concerns

This Bill sets a precedent of concern: the creeping erosion of rights afforded to citizens based on age, under the guise of productivity or extended contribution. If retirement is no longer respected as a transition to rest and self-direction, what follows next?

Moreover, shifting the goalposts without consultation undermines public trust in lawmaking — particularly among the elderly, who may feel both blindsided and disregarded.

3. Recommendations

• That the Bill not proceed.
• That if any review of the Juries Act 1981 is to occur, it be grounded in robust public consultation, demographic analysis, and input from the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights Commission, and older persons' advocacy groups.
• That the current right to opt out at 65 be retained and reaffirmed in statute as a matter of dignity and good governance.

4. Conclusion

The current legal threshold strikes an appropriate and balanced compromise: allowing willing older citizens to serve, while protecting the right of others to step back without prejudice or bureaucratic strain.

Registrars, meanwhile, are required to assess exemption requests under time constraints, often without reliable medical context or consistent documentation — increasing the risk of inconsistency, error, or inadvertent coercion.

The proposed amendment is unjustified in law, insensitive in spirit, and regressive in policy. I urge the Committee to reject this Bill in the name of fairness, human dignity, and the enduring mana of all those who have contributed to the life and strength of this nation — including their right to decline further duty with grace.

Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com