Submission on

Introduction

This submission is made in opposition to the Land Transport Management (Time of Use Charging) Amendment Bill, as introduced to Parliament under Government Bill 113-1.

The Bill seeks to amend the Land Transport Management Act 2003 to introduce a framework for time-of-use charging schemes, granting powers to local authorities, the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), and the Minister of Transport to impose congestion pricing in designated areas.

While reducing congestion is an important goal, this Bill prioritises revenue collection over fairness, lacks strong governance safeguards, and risks disproportionately impacting those who can least afford it. Without urgent amendments, it will lead to unjust financial burdens, government overreach, and ineffective congestion management.

This submission outlines the legal, economic, and governance concerns with the Bill and recommends that it be either withdrawn or substantially amended before further consideration.

1. Unfair Costs on Low-Income New Zealanders & Small Businesses

   • The Bill proposes time-of-use charging without statutory safeguards, disproportionately affecting low-income commuters, essential workers, and small businesses. The OECD (2018) Transport Policy Review emphasises that congestion pricing should only be introduced with reliable and affordable public transport alternatives—yet this Bill provides no guarantees of transit improvements.
   • The absence of statutory protections for vulnerable groups contradicts the principles outlined in the Land Transport Management Act 2003, particularly section 3, which mandates that land transport planning must contribute to an "effective, efficient, and safe land transport system in the public interest."
   • Additionally, section 65S(2) of the Bill provides broad discretion for scheme revenue allocation but lacks specific guarantees that funds will be reinvested into public transport improvements, contradicting the stated purpose of congestion management.
   • Small businesses operating within time-of-use charging zones may suffer reduced foot traffic, increased operational costs, and reduced competitiveness, yet the Bill does not provide compensation mechanisms or exemptions for essential commercial activities.

2. NZTA & Ministerial Overreach: Who Really Controls This?

   • The proposed governance structure (section 65V) creates a clear conflict of interest, as the NZTA—an agency financially benefiting from congestion pricing—holds the final decision-making power. The Public Sector Accountability Framework (2022) states that decision-making bodies must be independent from financial beneficiaries to prevent policy distortion.
   • The Minister of Transport is granted broad discretion under section 65G to approve or reject schemes without clear statutory guidelines, creating a risk of politically motivated decision-making rather than evidence-based policy implementation.
   • Section 65N enables the Minister to unilaterally terminate a scheme or appoint a scheme commissioner, granting sweeping powers without sufficient oversight mechanisms or independent review.

3. Public Consultation Without Accountability: A Fake Process?

   • While section 65E mandates public consultation, the Bill does not provide statutory guarantees that feedback must be incorporated into final decision-making, raising concerns about tokenistic consultation.
   • Additionally, the Bill fails to explicitly require independent cost-benefit analyses before approving a scheme. Section 65Z(2)(g) allows for a monetised summary of costs and benefits, but it is discretionary and not subject to independent audit requirements.
   • The cost-benefit analysis provided in the Congestion Question, Cost Benefit Analysis (2019) suggests an uncertain economic return, with estimates ranging from $0.70 to $1.80 per dollar spent. This wide range indicates significant financial risk without statutory protections against unprofitable schemes.

4. Privacy and Data Protection Issues

   • The Privacy Act 2020 (Sections 22-26) mandates that government agencies must limit data collection to essential purposes. However, section 65ZF of this Bill allows vehicle tracking and data storage with vague terms like "reasonably necessary," leaving citizens vulnerable to indefinite surveillance and data misuse.
   • The phrase “reasonably necessary” in section 65ZF(5) is vague and undefined, potentially allowing indefinite data retention. This contradicts the Privacy Act 2020, which requires clear limitations on data collection and retention.
   • The Bill does not provide explicit protections against the use of personal data for non-transport-related enforcement, leaving open the possibility of function creep—where infrastructure introduced for one purpose is repurposed for others without public consent—undermining privacy and eroding trust in public institutions.

5. Flawed Legal Enforcement: Unfair Penalties & Liability Issues

   • Section 65O(1) makes the registered vehicle owner liable for unpaid time-of-use charges, regardless of who was driving the vehicle. This creates an unreasonable legal burden, contradicting natural justice principles by assuming liability without proof of driver responsibility.
   • The penalty structure under section 65R imposes criminal liability for non-payment, yet does not provide sufficient avenues for dispute resolution or exemptions for extenuating circumstances, such as vehicle breakdowns.
   • Enforcement powers under section 65P allow for fines but lack proportionality in ensuring that penalties do not disproportionately impact those with genuine financial hardship.

6. Effectiveness and Risk of Unintended Consequences

   • The Bill assumes congestion pricing will reduce vehicle use, but in practice, many drivers may reroute to local or residential roads to avoid charges, worsening congestion and road safety in unintended areas.
   • Without statutory public transport service guarantees, time-of-use charging could trap individuals in an unavoidable financial burden, as viable alternatives may not exist in all regions.
   • The Bill does not require pilot testing before full-scale implementation, meaning there is no mandated evaluation period to determine whether congestion pricing actually achieves its intended goals in different cities.

Recommendations

REJECT THIS BILL unless these urgent amendments are made:

• Mandate low-income exemptions—time-of-use charging must not penalise those without viable transport alternatives.
• Require independent cost-benefit assessments—all congestion pricing schemes must prove they deliver a net public benefit before approval.
• Strengthen privacy safeguards—strict limits on vehicle tracking & data retention must be legislated.
• Pilot test congestion pricing—before any national rollout, conduct a 2-year test phase in one region with public evaluation mechanisms.

And Public transport service improvements must be a prerequisite before implementing any time-of-use charging scheme to ensure New Zealanders have viable, affordable alternatives.

Conclusion

The Bill prioritises revenue collection over fairness, lacks strong governance safeguards, and risks disproportionately impacting those who can least afford it.

This Bill is a direct attack on fairness, privacy, and economic justice. New Zealand deserves a transport system that is equitable, transparent, and responsive to community needs—not one that punishes the public under the guise of progress.

Parliament must REJECT this Bill in full or implement the critical amendments outlined above. New Zealanders deserve smarter, fairer, and more accountable transport solutions.