Local Government (Auckland Council) (Transport Governance) Amendment Bill
(Government Bill 201—1, Chris Bishop)
From: Ukes Baha | 09 November 2025
Submitted in response to the Committee’s call for submissions on the Bill
Oppose unless substantially amended as below. The Bill recentralises authority, embeds ministerial vetoes at multiple layers, and risks fragmentation, delay, and reduced transparency.
Remove ministerial control hooks; hard-wire public accountability; protect multi-modal integration; strengthen local board powers with funding; de-risk transition.
Problem: The ARTC’s voting membership and chair are partly controlled by central government.
Evidence: ss 38D(b) (Minister appoints up to 3 voting members); 38E(1) (chair jointly appointed by Minister and mayor); 39A(1)–(3) (Minister/mayor can remove chair and appointees at discretion).
Effect: Permanent central bloc + joint control of chair = structural leverage over Auckland decisions.
Amendment:
• Delete s 38D(b) and amend s 38D so all voting members are elected councillors (plus one non-voting NZTA/KiwiRail/PT CCO rep as drafted).
• Amend s 38E so the chair is appointed by Auckland Council after an independent merit process (no ministerial role).
• Repeal or limit s 39A so removal must meet stated, reviewable grounds (misconduct, incapacity), not “at discretion”.
Problem: Central government retains multiple approval gateways.
Evidence: s 42(4) (30-year plan requires Minister + Council approval); s 46(1)(b) (Council delegation to PT CCO requires Minister approval); s 38B(2) (Minister consultation before Council delegates to ARTC); s 38C (Minister can add ARTC functions by regulation).
Effect: Local autonomy becomes conditional; creates politicised bottlenecks.
Amendment:
• Amend s 42(4) to remove Ministerial approval; replace with: plan must be “not inconsistent with the current GPS” (objective test).
• Delete s 46(1)(b) and s 38B(2).
• Narrow s 38C so any added functions require Council concurrence and select-committee confirmation (affirmative resolution), not Order in Council alone.
Problem: Central sign-off on the core local roading framework.
Evidence: s 48(4)(b) (Minister must approve Framework or any variation).
Effect: Day-to-day network management tied to Wellington.
Amendment: Delete s 48(4)(b). Replace with a requirement to consult the Agency (NZTA) and certify consistency with LTMA/GPS — no veto.
Problem: ARTC can meet in private; reporting runs up to Minister/mayor.
Evidence: s 41(2) (may meet in private); s 41F (reports to Minister and mayor).
Effect: Weak public oversight of strategic Auckland transport settings.
Amendment:
• Reverse presumption in s 41(2): meetings open by default, with public exclusion only on LGOIMA grounds recorded by resolution.
• Add: publish agendas, papers, voting records, and minutes within 10 working days (with lawful redactions).
Problem: Decisions stand despite undisclosed conflicts.
Evidence: Schedule 3 cl 6(2) (failure to disclose doesn’t affect validity), cl 8 (limited avoidance).
Effect: Low deterrence; undermines trust.
Amendment:
• Make serious undisclosed conflicts voidable on application (High Court) and require independent investigation and public report.
• Require a public interests register updated quarterly on the Council website.
Problem: Plan must align Government and Council priorities; must “seek direction” from Minister and mayor.
Evidence: s 42(2)(a); s 42B(1)(a).
Effect: Locks long-term strategy to the Government of the day.
Amendment:
• Replace “aligns the priorities of the Government and Auckland Council” with “reflects Auckland community outcomes and is not inconsistent with the GPS” (retain national consistency without ministerial direction).
• Delete “seek direction” in s 42B(1)(a); replace with “have regard to written submissions from the Minister and the mayor published alongside the plan”.
Problem: Powers limited to local/collector roads; freight/PT override test vague.
Evidence: s 47C + Schedule 4 (scope); s 47B (must not “unreasonably interrupt” freight/PT).
Effect: Local decisions can be chilled by undefined thresholds; arterials/city-centre excluded.
Amendment:
• Define “unreasonably interrupt” with objective criteria (duration thresholds, diversion standards, network performance metrics).
• Provide ring-fenced funding and a statutory Statement of Transport Expectations for each local board to avoid tokenism.
• Require formal mediation before Governing Body can override a board decision.
Problem: Bylaws need all boards (or majority deemed “unreasonable” if they dissent).
Evidence: s 47D(2)–(5).
Effect: Gridlock risk; centralising tendency via Governing Body judgments.
Amendment:
• Replace with a two-stage process: (1) region-wide principles by Governing Body; (2) delegated board-level resolutions to implement locally, with independent facilitation for disputes and binding recommendations.
Problem: Six-month transition to move functions, assets, contracts, and staff.
Evidence: Schedule 1AA (transitional period; Transition Director; deeds of transfer; HR processes).
Effect: Service disruption; loss of institutional knowledge; cost blowouts.
Amendment:
• Extend the transitional period to 12–18 months.
• Require a published transition plan with milestones, monthly progress dashboards, risk register, and an independent gateway review at months 3 and 9.
• Add explicit no-redundancy-by-restructure guarantees for like-for-like roles during the period.
Problem: PT CCO narrowed to operations but weak on day-to-day accountability to passengers.
Evidence: ss 43A–44 (purpose and functions).
Effect: “On-time buses and ferries” aim lacks statutory service standards.
Amendment:
• Add to s 43B: mandatory published service metrics (punctuality, cancellations, capacity, accessibility), annual Passenger Charter, and independent complaints ombudsman with determinations reported to Council.
Problem: Plan prep must “establish processes to provide opportunities for Māori to contribute” (consultative framing).
Evidence: s 42B(1)(b), 42D(3).
Effect: Falls short of genuine partnership in Auckland transport strategy.
Amendment:
• Insert a Te Tiriti consistency clause applying to Part 4.
• Elevate participation to co-design with mana whenua for the 30-year plan and RLTP, with resourcing and clear decision-rights on matters of cultural impact and place-based design.
Problem: Consultation language is largely hortatory (“may be made available”, “should be encouraged”).
Evidence: s 42D(2)(a)–(f).
Effect: Variable practice; low minimums.
Amendment:
• Replace “may/should” with must; prescribe minimum consultation periods, accessible formats, hearings opportunities, and a published submissions analysis with reasons for acceptance/rejection.
1. Delete Ministerial veto of 30-year plan (s 42(4)) and replace with:
“(4) A plan is effective after it has been approved by Auckland Council and certified by the Agency as not inconsistent with the current Government Policy Statement on Land Transport.”
2. Remove Ministerial approval from roading framework (s 48(4)(b)):
Strike out paragraph (b); retain (a) consultation with the transport CCO and require certification of consistency by the Agency.
3. Re-constitute ARTC as wholly local (ss 38D–38F):
All voting members appointed by Auckland Council; chair appointed by Council after independent panel recommendation; Minister may submit advice but has no appointment or removal power.
4. Open-meeting default (s 41):
Replace s 41(2) with:
“(2) Meetings must be held in public unless there is good reason to withhold under sections 6 or 9 of the Official Information Act 1982; any resolution to exclude the public must state the specific ground relied on.”
5. Strengthen conflicts regime (Schedule 3 cl 6):
After 6(2) add: “(2A) A serious breach (knowing non-disclosure in a material decision) renders the decision voidable on application to the High Court and requires an independent investigation with findings published.”
6. Clarify “unreasonable interruption” (s 47B):
Add new subsection defining objective thresholds (e.g., freight average delay minutes, PT headway/throughput tests) and require a published impacts assessment.
7. Extend transition (Schedule 1AA):
Replace “6 months” wherever it appears with “12 months”, add clauses mandating milestone reporting, independent gateway reviews, and staff protection.
1. Why is Auckland uniquely subject to ministerial voting appointments and plan approval when other regions are not?
2. What objective test justifies ministerial approval of the local roading classification?
3. How will six months suffice to transfer RCA functions, assets, staff, and contracts without degrading service?
4. How will local boards exercise powers meaningfully without ring-fenced funding and clear “unreasonable interruption” criteria?
5. Why are ARTC meetings not open by default, given its regional strategic role?
Without the amendments above, the Bill centralises decision-making, weakens transparency, and risks delivery failure during transition. The Select Committee should adopt the fixes proposed to ensure genuine democratic accountability, credible regional strategy, and uninterrupted, passenger-centred transport services.
Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com