Formal Opposition to
Public Service Amendment Bill

(Government Bill 190–1, Judith Collins)

From: Ukes Baha | 19 August 2025

Submitted in response to the call for public submissions on the Public Service Amendment Bill

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Summary of Position

I oppose the Public Service Amendment Bill in its current form.

While presented as a measure to “drive improvements in performance” and “deliver value for money,” the bill functions as a centralisation of executive control. It concentrates power in the Public Service Commissioner and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, weakens worker protections, politicises appointments and advice, embeds secrecy through classified security provisions, and extends immunity for senior officials. Rather than strengthening stability and service to New Zealanders, it undermines accountability, neutrality, and public trust.

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1. Centralisation of Commissioner Power

Reference: s.55A; Schedule 7 cls. 9A–11.

Problem:

• Allows the Commissioner to designate “key positions” in departments and interdepartmental ventures, controlling appointments, performance reviews, and restructures.
• Reduces agency autonomy over senior roles, exposing the system to politicised gatekeeping.
• Performance review frameworks for chief executives are designed by the Commissioner but shaped through Ministerial consultation, blurring independence.

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2. Politicisation of Policy Advice

Reference: s.66A (Policy Advisory Group, DPMC).

Problem:

• Creates a policy advisory group reporting directly to the Prime Minister, staffed on rolling fixed-term contracts.
• Risks forming a political cadre inside the public service, weakening contestable, neutral advice across departments.
• Justifications ("periodic change" and "complementary mix") enable churn over merit and continuity.

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3. Weakening Worker Protections

Reference: ss.89A–89E; s.89C.

Problem:

• Restricts redundancy entitlements during transfers between public service agencies and Crown entities.
• Splits collective agreement coverage after reorganisations, fragmenting bargaining power and conditions.
• Normalises insecure fixed-term arrangements for policy staff.

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4. Oversight of Misconduct Investigations

Reference: ss.94A–94B.

Problem:

• Requires notification to, and annual reporting for, the Commissioner on misconduct investigations.
• Centralises sensitive employment processes, risking politicisation and undermining natural justice if data is used selectively or punitively.

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5. Expanded Immunities

Reference: s.104.

Problem:

• Extends legal immunity to chief executives “acting in any capacity,” weakening accountability.
• Reduces public recourse in cases of negligence, maladministration, or wrongful decision-making.

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6. National Security and Secrecy Powers

Reference: Schedule 3, cls. 5B–5F.

Problem:

• Authorises the Commissioner to direct agencies to restrict or ban vendors, services, or products using classified security information.
• Limits transparency and due process: affected parties receive only partial summaries and courts operate under secrecy orders from the Security Information in Proceedings Act 2022.
• Allows foreign-provided intelligence to block disclosure, enabling external influence over domestic administrative decisions.

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7. Cost Recovery and Burden on Agencies

Reference: Schedule 3, cl. 5A(3); cl. 43(3).

Problem:

• Requires agencies to reimburse the Commission for investigations and performance reviews into them.
• Creates perverse incentives to avoid scrutiny and diverts funds from frontline services to compliance costs.

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8. Long‑Term Policy Capture

Reference: Schedule 6, cl. 8; cl. 10.

Problem:

• Concentrates long-term insights briefings and policy-development guidance in DPMC.
• Reduces pluralism of foresight across agencies and centralises agenda-setting in the executive.

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9. Business Continuity Compliance Layer

Reference: Schedule 6, cl. 11.

Problem:

• Mandates continuity plans to be provided to the Commissioner on request.
• Risks becoming another reporting exercise rather than building genuine operational resilience.

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Conclusion and Recommendations

This bill represents not renewal but erosion. It centralises power in the Commissioner and the Prime Minister’s Department, undermines neutrality, weakens worker protections, expands secrecy, and shields senior officials from accountability.

I recommend the Committee:

1. Withdraw the bill in full.
2. Remove Commissioner control over “key positions” and restore agency autonomy in appointments.
3. Disestablish the politicised Policy Advisory Group structure in DPMC.
4. Restore redundancy and collective bargaining protections for staff.
5. Limit immunity provisions to preserve accountability for chief executives.
6. Reject classified-security decision-making without robust due process and disclosure safeguards.
7. Prohibit cost recovery for Commission investigations and performance reviews.
8. Ensure long-term policy advice is plural and independent, not monopolised by DPMC.
9. Retain genuine independence for chief executives free from Ministerial influence.

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Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com