(Government Bill 155–1, David Seymour)
From: Ukes Baha | 29 May 2025
Submitted in response to the call for public submissions on the Regulatory Standards Bill.
This submission constitutes a total and uncompromising opposition to the Regulatory Standards Bill (155–1), introduced by David Seymour.
This bill is a political device designed to centralise ministerial power, neutralise independent oversight, and embed ideological control over lawmaking under the false banner of regulatory improvement.
It should never have been proposed. It breaches the spirit of democratic lawmaking, bypasses foundational principles of Treaty partnership, and endangers the integrity of public regulation in Aotearoa.
Rushed, misleading, and ideologically driven — this bill serves private agendas, not public interest. It must be rejected in its entirety.
Full legal case references and detailed analysis are included in the Appendices (A–D).
Clause 38 grants unilateral power to the Minister for Regulation to appoint and remove members of the proposed Regulatory Standards Board. This establishes a board with no independence, no safeguard from political interference, and no external check or counterbalance.
Clause 29 ensures that the Board conducts all reviews "on the papers". No public hearings, no cross-examination, no oral submissions. This simulated process bears no resemblance to open administrative justice (Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130, CA — see Appendix A), where procedural fairness requires active and meaningful engagement.
Clause 25 explicitly denies that breaches of the bill's principles affect the validity of legislation. The Board may issue reports, but they are non-binding, unenforceable, and politically disposable.
The combination of ministerial control, closed process, and non-binding output renders the Board an instrument of theatre, not of law.
The "principles of responsible regulation" in Clause 8 are legal abstractions without legal effect. Clause 24 confirms they are not enforceable in any court. Clause 26 allows any minister to override them by merely stating a justification.
This contravenes any accepted interpretation of principles-based law. It introduces guidelines that are immune from judicial review (Bulk Gas Users Group v AG [1983] NZLR 129 — see Appendix B) and creates a vacuum of accountability.
In regulatory drafting, principles are only meaningful where they can:
Here, they do none.
Clauses 10, 14, and 19 empower the Minister to exempt entire categories of legislation from the bill’s purview. Clause 27 allows the Minister and Attorney-General to issue joint guidance on how the principles apply, shaping the framework to suit political preferences.
This is a direct violation of democratic norms, which rely on separation of powers and transparent checks on executive discretion (Fitzgerald v Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615 — see Appendix C).
The power to both write the rules and exempt oneself from them is not reform — it is a blueprint for abuse.
The principles in Clause 8 are ideologically charged:
There is no reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, equity, or marginalised communities. This is not neutrality. It is a selective privileging of libertarian economics over collective obligation.
Regulation must account for public interest and Treaty obligations, not reduce them to afterthoughts. The exclusion of Te Tiriti obligations places the bill in breach of the Cabinet Manual 2023 (Chapter 5.37) and constitutional conventions affirmed in NZ Māori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 — see Appendix D).
Clauses 42–47 grant the Ministry for Regulation power to compel information from any government department, statutory body, or contracted provider. This includes NGOs, Crown entities, and community service partners under Clause 43(2)(b).
Failure to comply may lead to enforcement through the High Court.
This broad surveillance-style power lacks safeguards, appeal mechanisms, or procedural checks. It is disproportionate and risks misuse for ideological audit or institutional coercion — not genuine regulatory correction.
The bill contains multiple self-serving exemptions:
This undermines the bill’s stated goal of consistency. It carves out exactly those areas where government power is most sensitive, creating regulatory asymmetry.
This bill must be understood not as an isolated proposal, but as part of a coordinated legislative pattern under the current coalition government — a systematic dismantling of democratic safeguards, Treaty protections, and public oversight structures. The language may shift from bill to bill, but the agenda remains consistent: centralise control, erode rights, and reframe power as reform.
Examples of this pattern include:
Each of these bills follows a shared strategic architecture: use sophisticated language to present harmful reform as responsible governance, while simultaneously removing public mechanisms to contest, review, or reverse their impacts.
This is not modernisation. It is legislative erosion — slow, deliberate, and dangerously consistent.
The Regulatory Standards Bill must be rejected in full.
It is not reform. It is regression. It does not clarify law. It conceals control. It offers no valid legislative structure upon which to build.
New Zealand does not need controlled boards, hollow principles, or ministerial monopolies on scrutiny. It needs authentic transparency, independent oversight, and public protection.
Summary: Mrs Daganayasi, facing deportation, applied to remain in New Zealand on humanitarian grounds. The Minister declined her application based on confidential departmental advice about her son's health — without disclosing or testing that advice.
Legal Issue: Whether failure to disclose material relied upon in an administrative decision violated the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: Yes. The Court of Appeal ruled that even discretionary decisions by Ministers must meet the basic standards of fairness. Affected individuals are entitled to know and respond to material used against them.
Relevance: Clause 29 of the Regulatory Standards Bill enables closed, internal reviews without disclosure or hearing. This simulated process directly violates the principle affirmed in Daganayasi — that procedural fairness must be meaningful, not symbolic.
Summary: The government issued a non-binding policy on gas pricing. The plaintiffs argued that the policy had de facto regulatory effects and sought judicial review.
Legal Issue: Can government-issued policy statements be subject to judicial review if they are non-binding?
Conclusion: No — unless the policy has direct legal effect on individuals’ rights or duties. Non-binding principles may influence administration but are not reviewable on their own.
Relevance: Clause 8 of the Bill creates a list of “principles” with no legal force — immune from judicial review, yet positioned to shape regulatory interpretation. This places critical administrative conduct beyond legal accountability, echoing the limitations exposed in Bulk Gas.
Summary: Prime Minister Robert Muldoon announced the suspension of a superannuation law without legislative repeal, asserting executive power to halt its operation before Parliament acted.
Legal Issue: Can the Executive suspend or override law without statutory repeal by Parliament?
Conclusion: No. The Court ruled this unconstitutional under the Bill of Rights 1688, which prohibits any branch of government from suspending laws without Parliament’s consent.
Relevance: The Regulatory Standards Bill allows the Minister to exempt entire categories of legislation (Clauses 10, 14, and 19), effectively overriding laws by executive discretion. This mirrors the unconstitutional overreach condemned in Fitzgerald v Muldoon.
Summary: The Crown proposed transferring broadcasting assets without measures to protect te reo Māori. The Māori Council challenged the move, arguing it breached Treaty obligations to preserve taonga.
Legal Issue: Does the Crown have active duties under the Treaty of Waitangi to protect Māori interests in cultural and strategic areas?
Conclusion: Yes. The Court affirmed the Crown’s duty to act in good faith, engage actively with Māori interests, and uphold the principles of partnership and protection under Te Tiriti.
Relevance: The Regulatory Standards Bill entirely omits Te Tiriti o Waitangi. This exclusion breaches Cabinet Manual 2023 (cl. 5.37) and the legal obligations recognised in NZ Māori Council v Attorney-General. The omission is not neutral — it is a deliberate bypass of constitutional principles.