Formal Opposition to
Review of Standing Orders 2026

(Standing Orders Committee, Parliament of New Zealand)

From: Ukes Baha | 24 September 2025

Submitted in response to the call for submissions on the Review of Standing Orders 2026

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Summary of Position

I oppose the Review of Standing Orders 2026 in its current trajectory.

Framed as efficiency and modernisation, this review entrenches Executive dominance, weakens select committee scrutiny, sidelines Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and reduces the ability of citizens to hold Parliament accountable.

Core stance: Standing Orders are not technical housekeeping. They are the constitutional rules that decide whether Parliament serves the people or the Government of the day. At present, they erode scrutiny, centralise control, and silence public voice.

Recommendation: Withdraw the review in its current form. If Parliament proceeds, it must embed reforms that restore scrutiny, empower committees, prohibit urgency abuse, strengthen Treaty oversight, and guarantee Te Tiriti partnership.

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Constitutional & Human Rights Framework

• Constitutional weight: Standing Orders are New Zealand’s closest equivalent to a written constitution in action; treating them as procedural housekeeping diminishes their constitutional role.
• Democratic accountability: Standing Orders must enable Parliament to check the Executive; current settings entrench Cabinet control (PPNZ 2023, Part 5, ch. 34).
• Public voice: Submissions, petitions, and inquiries should open Parliament to citizens, but omnibus legislation, urgency, and secrecy undermine them (PPNZ 2023, Part 7, ch. 49).
• Te Tiriti o Waitangi: A constitutional instrument that governs Parliament’s workings cannot remain silent on Te Tiriti. Silence is structural exclusion; Māori are treated as submitters, not partners.
• Human rights obligations: Transparency, participation, and accountability are duties under ICCPR, UNCAC, and UNDRIP and must be embedded in Standing Orders.
• Control of the purse: Executive dominance via financial vetoes, permanent appropriations, and imprest supply undermines Parliament’s historic fiscal sovereignty (PPNZ 2023, Part 6, ch. 42–43).
• Transparency: Closed deliberations and weak reporting erode trust (PPNZ 2023, Part 4, ch. 30; Part 7, ch. 51).

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Key Erosions

1. Business Committee Centralisation
   The Business Committee sets committee structures and procedures, concentrating power in a handful of senior MPs and suppressing minority voices (PPNZ 2023, Part 4, ch. 25).

2. Government Majorities on Committees
   Proportional membership rules ensure Government majorities; committees often function as extensions of Cabinet rather than checks (PPNZ 2023, Part 4, ch. 26).

3. Overwork and Shallow Scrutiny
   MPs’ multiple committee assignments drive reliance on departmental advice and limit independent examination (PPNZ 2023, Part 4, ch. 26).

4. Abuse of Urgency
   Urgency truncates six-month scrutiny, squeezes out hearings, and excludes public submissions (PPNZ 2023, Part 5, ch. 37).

5. Closed-Door Deliberations
   Committee deliberations remain secret; broadcasting covers only select moments, shielding political deals from view (PPNZ 2023, Part 4, ch. 30).

6. Inquiries and Petitions Hollowed Out
   Petitions—an “ancient right”—and inquiries are sidelined by workloads and process, reducing citizen redress to symbolism (PPNZ 2023, Part 7, ch. 49).

7. Treaty Scrutiny as Rubber-Stamping
   Only 15 sitting days for international treaty examination precludes meaningful iwi consultation or public participation (PPNZ 2023, Part 7, ch. 53).

8. Government Bills Dominate the House
   In the 52nd Parliament, Government bills comprised the overwhelming majority of introductions and enactments, marginalising Members’ and local bills (PPNZ 2023, Part 5, ch. 34).

9. Omnibus Bills and Loopholes
   Despite prohibitions on “miscellaneous law reform,” unrelated provisions are bundled under a “single broad policy” or via Business Committee approval (PPNZ 2023, Part 5, ch. 34).

10. Secondary Legislation and Executive Discretion
    Most law each year is made through secondary legislation with far less oversight than bills (PPNZ 2023, Part 5, ch. 41).

11. Government’s Financial Veto
    The undefined standard of “more than a minor impact” on fiscal aggregates, immune from Speaker challenge, hands the Executive an unchecked veto (PPNZ 2023, Part 6, ch. 42.5).

12. Appropriations Beyond Scrutiny
    Permanent and multi-year appropriations lock in expenditure and erode annual parliamentary control (PPNZ 2023, Part 6, ch. 43.4).

13. Imprest Supply as Blank Cheque
    Imprest Supply operates as a de facto “blank cheque,” with interim spending only retrospectively legalised (PPNZ 2023, Part 6, ch. 43.5.2).

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Anticipated Counterarguments

• Efficiency: True efficiency requires public trust, not rushed scrutiny or closed committees.
• Modernisation: Modernisation must embed transparency, human rights, and Treaty partnership, not expand Executive shortcuts.
• Flexibility: Flexibility without safeguards is simply unchecked power.
• Comparative practice: Peer Westminster systems (UK, Canada) have strengthened committee independence, amendment powers, and limits on urgency; New Zealand should not regress.

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Conclusion & Recommendations

The Standing Orders are the foundation of New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy. As they stand, they entrench Executive dominance, weaken scrutiny, and silence the public. The 2026 review must not be cosmetic; it must confront structural erosion.

Recommendations

1. Withdraw the review in its current form.
2. If proceeding:
   • End Government majorities on committees.
   • Prohibit urgency from curtailing scrutiny.
   • Empower committees to amend bills directly.
   • Extend treaty scrutiny and embed iwi consultation.
   • Resource committees independently of departments.
   • Strengthen petition and inquiry processes with binding responses.
   • Remove vague veto powers and define fiscal thresholds.
   • Limit omnibus bills and require single-subject integrity.
   • Mandate publication of committee deliberation transcripts after conclusion.
   • Guarantee a minimum number of Members’ bills for debate each session.
   • Embed Te Tiriti o Waitangi into Standing Orders.

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References

• Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (5th ed., 2023), Clerk of the House of Representatives, 24 October 2023.
• Joseph, P.A. (2022). Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (6th ed.). Thomson Reuters.
• Palmer, G. & Butler, A. (2018). Towards Democratic Renewal: Ideas for Constitutional Change in New Zealand. Victoria University Press.
• United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
• United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
• United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

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Respectfully submitted,
Ukes Baha
Public Health Advocate | Counsellor | Policy Analyst
ukesbaha.com